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This article develops an analytic framework for comparing dispute
processing within a single institution and across different cultures, by
focusing on the transformation of disputes. Case studies from diverse
nonwestern and western settings are examined to show how disputes
change as they are processed in response to the interests of various
participants. Disputants, supporters, third parties, and relevant publics
seek to rephrase and thus transform a dispute by imposing established
categories for classifying events and relationships (narrowing), or by
developing a framework which challenges established categories
(expansion). Disputes may be expanded by adding new issues, by
enlarging the arena of discussion, or by increasing the number and
type of active participants. Thus, how the dispute is defined
(language) and the roles played by various participants are critical
features of the dispute. We focus on the agent of transformation, with
special attention to the degree of audience participation, particularly in
dispute expansion. We suggest the importance of expansion as a
mechanism through which new rules emerge in the legal process, and
through which social change is linked to legal change.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our aim in this paper is to suggest the usefulness of the
concept "transformation of a dispute" in (1) improving our
understanding of how people manage processes of disputing
and (2) showing how law and other normative frameworks are
articulated, imposed, circumvented, and created as people
negotiate social order in their transactions with one another.
We draw upon case studies of dispute processing in a variety of
* Contributions of authors equal; name ordering alphabetical. This
research was prepared under Grant Number 78 NI-AX-0138 from the National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or
opinions stated in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
An earlier version of this paper, 'Triads and the Transformation of
Conflict," was presented at the Law and Society Association annual meeting,
May 10-12, 1979, San Francisco, California. Since that presentation, the paper
has been revised several times. A number of people provided us with helpful
comments and criticism based on their reading of earlier drafts. We are
especially grateful to Hoyt Alverson, Henry Ehrmann, David Engel, Joel
Grossman, Milton Heumann, Jack Katz, Sally Merry, and Stuart Scheingold.
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social, political, and economic settings and move toward
developing an analytic framework for comparing cases both
within a single dispute-processing institution and across
different cultures. This framework should facilitate the
comparison of disputes processed in institutional settings as
widely different as courts, gossip networks, and broadly
inclusive community arenas. Further, this framework will
suggest how the processing of individual disputes is linked to
larger considerations of social and political order. Specifically,
we are interested in the relation between the definition and
transformation of disputes, on the one hand, 9nd the
maintenance and change of legal and other normative systems,
on the other.
By dispute we mean a particular stage of a social
relationship in which conflict between two parties (individuals
or groups) is asserted publicly-that is, before a third party
(see Gulliver, 1969: 14; Abel, 1973: 226-227; Nader and Todd, 1978:
14-15). The third party may have an explicit role with respect
to handling the dispute, as does the mediator, go-between, or
judge; or act as an implicit third party, as do other parties such
as supporters or an audience.1 The dispute stage can be
distinguished from the grievance stage (of perception by one
party of a wrong or injustice) and the stage of dyadic
confrontation between the two parties (Nader and Todd, 1978:
14-15). One thinks of a grievance escalating into a dyadic
confrontation, which then develops into a dispute; but in fact
these stages of a disagreement are not necessarily sequential,
and not every conflict goes through each stage. In addition, the
grievance as initially perceived by one party may not be the
object of the dispute once the matter is aired in public.
An assumption fundamental to our approach is that a
dispute is not a static event which simply "happens," but that
the structure of disputes, quarrels, and offenses includes
changes or transformations over time. Transformations occur
because participants in the disputing process have different
interests in and perspectives on the dispute; participants assert
these interests and perspectives in the very process of defining
and shaping the object of the dispute. What a dispute is about,
whether it is even a dispute or not, and whether it is properly a
1 Eisenberg (1976: 662-663), for example, suggests that supporters play an
implicit third-party role: "negotiations conducted jointly by an actor and his
allies on an institutionalized basis tend to slide imperceptibly into adjudication
by the allies. Thus in Arusha dispute-settlement mechanisms, affiliates may
put considerable pressure upon the disputants to go along with a settlement
they judge appropriate" (emphasis ours).
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"legal" dispute, may be central issues for negotiation in the
disputing process.,2
By transformation of a dispute we mean a change in its
form or content as a result of the interaction and involvement
of other participants in the dispute process. Transformation is
continuous, beginning when one party initially perceives a
grievance against another. But in this paper we do not
consider those changes involved in the early definition and
emergence of conflict. 3 Instead we focus on transformation
after the conflict has been brought to a third party. Note that
changes in the content of a dispute may not be distinguishable
from changes in the form, since the inclusion or exclusion of
certain facts or issues affects the way options are articulated
and solutions are perceived (Barkun, 1968: 143; Levi, 1949).
At a fundamental level, the transformation of a dispute
involves a process of rephrasing-that is, some kind of
reformulation into a public discourse. Even the most
rudimentary forms of disputing, such as public shouting
matches which largely involve repetition and reiteration of the
charges (Koch, 1974: 70, 104-105), include some form of
rephrasing as the dispute proceeds; Eskimo song duels involve
sophisticated forms of rephrasing (Hoebel, 1954); and
nonverbal disputing such as chest-pounding, side-slapping,
club fights (Chagnon, 1968: 118) can also be conceptualized as a
way of reformulating a dispute to facilitate settlement and
avoid breakdown of relations. In these examples, an audience
or group of supporters acts implicitly as the third party to the
dispute. As the role of the third party becomes more explicit,
then the rephrasing is likely to reflect a greater, or more
substantive, shift in the definition of the dispute.
Collier (1973), for example, describes transformation of
disputes among the Zinacantan Indians of Mexico. She
describes how litigants each present their own version of the
"facts" to a mediator, knowing which outcomes are likely to
result from which facts; then "the mediator's task is to
rephrase the different accounts until the litigants agree on a
single version of the events-a version that to the outsider
might be puzzlingly skewed from reality" (Collier, 1973: 96).
This "skewed" version of the dispute may continue to reflect
2 See especially Santos (1977), Strauss (1978), and Rosett and Cressey
(1976). This perspective emerges as well in each of our earlier works (see
Mather, 1977; 1978; Yngvesson, 1976; 1978).
3 For recent exploration of these aspects of transformation, see Felstiner
et al. (1981); FitzGerald, Hickman, and Dickins (1980); Boyum (1980).
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the interests of either or both of the disputants, but it will most
certainly also reflect the interests of the third party. Shapiro
(1975: 325) argues that even the most informal kind of third
party, such as a go-betweern, nevertheless "exerts influence by
'rephrasing' the message he delivers." Yet a skillful third party
will accomplish this without appearing to force a value choice;
rather, he will construe the facts in such a way that norms
seem to relate to them inevitably (Barkun, 1968: 147). This is
the essence of the rephrasing process. It presents a
formulation which disputants and others might accept, and at
the same time satisfies the interests of a third party. The
interests of the third party in the dispute process may be of
several kinds, as delineated by Santos (1977: 19): "personal
interests ... the interests inherent in the role he performs and
the interests of the audiences to whom he looks for rewards"
(see also Shapiro, 1975: 327).
Narrowing is the process through which established
categories for classifying events and relationships are imposed
on an event or series of events, defining the subject matter of a
dispute in ways which make it amenable to conventional
management procedures. Narrowing is the most common
process of dispute transformation, and is particularly marked
when a dispute is handled by officials of a specialized tribunal,
such as a court, with highly routinized ways of handling cases.
By "established" categories of the narrowing process we mean
those categories which are linked to interests of the third party
hearing the dispute. Third parties are often part of the local
establishment. Typically then, one could say that (1)
established categories at an initial dispute hearing will be those
which are valid for a local elite; (2) there may be different
categories for narrowing, even at the local level, and more than
one may have legitimacy; (3) an established category in the
local culture may or may not coincide with the "official" legal
category; and (4) what is established at one legal level may not
be established for another (see Collier, 1973; cf. Pospisil, 1958).
Note that narrowing in this sense means fixing or
circumscribing a framework in which the dispute is defined,
rather than simply reducing or limiting the number of issues.
4
Expansion, in contrast, refers to a rephrasing in terms of a
framework not previously accepted by the third party.
Expansion challenges established categories for classifying
4 The narrowing and expanding of issues is discussed, for example, by
Ulmer (1979) in the context of Supreme Court decision making. See also Abel
(1973) and Santos (1977).
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events and relationships by linking subjects or issues that are
typically separated, thus "stretching" or changing accepted
frameworks for organizing reality. Expansion does not
necessarily imply the increase or magnification of issues in a
dispute (although this may occur); it refers to change or
development in the normative framework used to interpret the
dispute. There is no neat line which clearly distinguishes
narrowing from expansion, but there does seem to be
something rather special about transformations which try to
change the perspective through which disputes are commonly
perceived. Thus we will focus on expansion with a view to
identifying the strategies associated with expansion, the
implications of expanded disputes for legal change, and the
conditions under which disputes can be expanded.
We argue here that the expansion of individual disputes is
one way that social change is linked to legal change. This point
and our emphasis on changes in the framework of argument
are, of course, classic themes in the study of the judicial
process, as presented, for example, in Levi's (1949) An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning and in Gluckman's (1955) The
Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. The
legal process, says Levi, is not "the application of known rules
to diverse facts," but rather a system of rules which are
discovered in the process of determining similarity or
difference between cases; "the finding of similarity or difference
is the key step in the legal process" (1949: 3, 2). What
determines that key step? Levi says that litigants and their
lawyers must present competing examples or analogies to the
court, and the judge will then choose the determining
classification (1949: 2-5).
Gluckman's analysis of legal reasoning of the Lozi judges
also focuses heavily on the role of the judge in "discovering"
rules and in changing, while simultaneously maintaining, the
legal framework. Gluckman provides numerous examples to
show how Lozi judges, through the process of legal reasoning
and case-by-case decision making, "have redefined their basic
concepts to accommodate new facts of life" (1955: 325). He
argues that this process of redefinition is accomplished in a
gradual way because Lozi legal and moral concepts are highly
flexible and ambiguous, and thus easily expand to incorporate
changing social and political conditions. While the general
concepts are being changed (with new meaning assigned by
the judges), the labels remain the same (Gluckman, 1955: 324-
325). Thus both Levi and Gluckman employ judicial reasoning
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as a vehicle for explaining the "key step" through which new
rules emerge in the legal process. Recent research in several
bodies of literature has demonstrated the complexity of that
key step, however, and has pointed to the critical role of
participants other than the judge in shaping the process of
legal change.
The framework we are advancing is an attempt to integrate
analyses of legal reasoning such as those of Levi and Gluckman
with ideas and findings from dispute processing literatures
which focus more heavily on the social and political context of
the legal process. We examine studies of lawyers and the
mobilization of law, of trial courts and the judicial process, and
of mediation, gossip, and other mechanisms discussed in the
cross-cultural literature. Thus, we consider the differing
abilities of litigants to argue their cases; the role of lawyers in
shaping the way disputes are defined and presented; the
influence of various publics or audiences with an interest in the
definition and outcome of a particular case; and the complex
relationships and informal norms which develop among groups
of persons who cooperate in processing cases, whether in a trial
court, a gossip network, or an open community arena. These
factors must be integrated with empirical theory about legal
order and change through reasoning by example. In addition, it
is important that theory incorporate our knowledge of dispute
processing and normative change in diverse sociocultural
settings, both western and nonwestern.
Examination of these various literatures suggests the
particular importance of three variables shaping the
transformation of disputes: language, participants, and
audience.
Language
The definition of a dispute articulated by each participant
is a social construct which orders "facts" and invokes "norms"
in particular ways-ways that reflect the personal interest or
values of the participant, or that anticipate the definitions
offered by others. These definitions of a dispute are similar to
the "paradigms of argument" developed by Comaroff and
Roberts (1977). In their discussion of Tswana dispute
settlement, they suggest that disputants construct a "paradigm
of argument" which is "a coherent picture of relevant events
and actions in terms of one or more (implicit or explicit)
normative referents" (Roberts, 1977: 86, italics omitted). Case
materials suggest that an important feature of disputing in all
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social contexts (including those lacking written legal codes) is
a struggle over these paradigms. How a relationship or dispute
is phrased has significant implications for the power of
competing individuals or factions with vested interests in the
primacy of a particular framework.
Where there are written legal codes and an official
language of disputing, language may become an even more
critical variable shaping the disputing process. Under these
circumstances, as Thompson (1975: 264-265) notes, the language
of law must be reckoned with in its own terms: both rulers and
ruled must explicitly deal with it as a point of reference in
arguing cases and in legitimizing particular courses of action.
Knowledge of "the law" and skill in manipulating its language
become critical resources for defining and transforming
disputes. We consider the language of disputing as varying
along a continuum, with everyday discourse at one end and a
highly specialized "language of law" at the other; we explore
the effect of variation in language on the ways in which
disputes are transformed, and on the roles of participants in
the disputing process.
Participants
Although there has been a good deal of emphasis in the
literature on dyadic versus triadic forms of disputing, case
materials and recent theoretical work suggest that dispute
negotiations are shaped by relations and transactions among a
number of participants, not simply the disputants and a third
party. We are specifically concerned with the roles of the
disputants' supporters and representatives and by the relevant
audience to the dispute. Participants (whether individuals or
groups, whether disputants, supporters, or third parties) vary
in terms of their power to shape the dispute and influence its
outcome. Power is in part an attribute of the participants
themselves, and in this sense participants will be distributed
along a continuum of power in which degree of knowledge,
experience, economic resources, or social standing will
determine position.
It is clear, however, that power in the disputing process
involves more than the attributes of individuals. It may
depend, for example, on the relationship between the disputing
parties and the legal forum. In organizationally complex
arenas with a highly specialized language of law, as Galanter
(1974) has argued, those who frequently engage in litigation
(repeat players) are advantaged over those who only
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occasionally use the courts (one-shotters). In addition, power
of participants may be influenced by the relationship of the
disputing forum to the the broader society. If the disputing
forum tends to exclude participation by other than the
immediate parties or their representatives, then the power to
transform a dispute in desired ways may be limited by lack of a
relevant public or audience.
Audience
Understanding the role of the audience(s) in dispute
processing is especially important in an analysis of
transformation of disputes (see Santos, 1977: 18-20).
Schattschneider (1960: 2) argues, "The spectators are an
integral part of the situation, for, as likely as not, the audience
determines the outcome of the fight." Carter (1979: 227) makes
a similar point in discussing what judging entails: "To judge is
to decide with reference to the expectations of an audience that
defines the process of decision." This suggests how
mobilization of a particular audience, either by the disputants
or by a third party, might be a crucial strategy in the
management of a dispute. Audience participation may vary
from virtual exclusion of anyone but the participants to direct
involvement by outsiders who physically watch the process,
follow its progress, or verbally engage in the disputing
discussions. Besides exploring the impact of audience
participation, we also consider the conditions under which it is
likely to occur and be influential. We draw on Edelman's (1964;
1971; 1977) work in symbolic politics and political language to
discuss processes through which audiences are mobilized and
disputes expanded.
Focus on language, participants, and audience helps us to
explain dispute transformations and the degree to which those
transformations lead to particular case outcomes, and influence
order maintenance and change. These variables are by no
means exhaustive; furthermore, their precise interaction
cannot be specified at the present time, since transformation
processes are extremely complex. Our aim in this paper is to
suggest ideas for building a theory of transformation of
disputes; as yet no theory enables us to predict how a given
dispute is likely to be transformed.
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II. NARROWING
To fix the object of a dispute is to narrow it. That is exactly what the
legal process does in defining what is to be decided. This selection is
determined by the needs and purposes of the legal process (Santos,
1977: 18).
Most disputes are transformed through some kind of
narrowing-that is, through the use of established categories to
organize the events and issues in dispute. Typically one thinks
of narrowing in highly differentiated legal arenas where
specialized legal discourse is used to transform disputes in
prescribed ways. But the process is a fundamental aspect of
disputing, occurring in contexts as widely diverse as the "house
palavers" of the Kpelle (Gibbs, 1963), the public shouting
matches and scuffles of the Jali (Koch, 1974), and the gossip
networks of North Atlantic villages (Peters, 1972; Yngvesson,
1976). In these settings, as in specialized forums, participants
argue about which definition should be imposed on the events
and relationships in a dispute; the question of which definition
will be used is of considerable significance to the outcome.
Whether the discourse is specialized or more general, disputes
will be narrowed in ways acceptable to a third party (either to
appeal to the third party or inflicted by the third party). This
introduces interests beyond those of the disputants into the
dispute at hand; most likely these additional interests will
reflect power of the third or political interests of those
connected to the third. In this way rephrasing of disputes into
established categories merges with the conflict-resolving and
social control activities of the third party (see Shapiro, 1975).
In presenting the following cases to illustrate narrowing,
we are especially interested in how language (or "conceptual
space"), as well as physical space, influences dispute
transformations and defines the roles of participants in the
disputing process. Thus the central foci of our discussion will
be the language of disputing and interrelationships between
shifts in language, changes in the roles of participants,
definitions of the events in a particular dispute, dispute
outcomes, and broader patterns of social organization.
Narrowing Through General Discourse
Some changes in the definition of a dispute are deceptively
simple: e.g., a dispute over complex issues is translated into
the terms of a currency (money, pigs, land, cattle) which allows
the issues in dispute to be quantified. Thus Collier (1973: 169),
showing how kin disputes among the Zinacantan Indians of
Mexico are rephrased as property disputes, notes that
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"Zinacantecos, like many peoples, reduce ... complex,
subjective problems ... to straightforward disagreements over
something tangible, something that can be objectively
measured and divided." Tort actions under common law
epitomize this kind of transformation of disputes over injuries
into disputes over money. For instance, Rosenthal's (1974)
study illustrates how a personal injury plaintiff describes an
accident to his lawyer in terms of a broad range of medical,
emotional, family, work-related, and other concerns; the lawyer
then rephrases the account in terms of a dollars-and-cents
description of the case. Translation into the terms of a
currency, such as money or, as in the first case below, pigs,
converts the complex into the straightforward; significantly,
however, it also reinforces the dominance of a particular
currency as the standard through which people, products, and
other resources are made commensurable.
5
The case of the Stubborn Gardener is drawn from Koch's
(1974) ethnography of the Jal, a people in highland New
Guinea who lack institutionalized leaders and whose political
organization is based on lineage descent and affiliation.
Although the JalM lack formal legal institutions, disputes are
managed in predictable ways, in the framework of agreed-upon
idioms for articulating and transforming conflict. The Jald's
major idiom for rephrasing is provided by their primary trade
item, pigs. Koch writes that "every pig is a potential vehicle for
the validation and reaffirmation of social relationships. All
major events in a person's life cycle, the settlement of serious
disputes, and the ratification of peace agreements require the
transfer of pigs" (1974: 42). Significantly, means for the
successful use of this idiom are controlled by JalM "big men,"
individuals whose managerial finesse and verbal skills have
resulted in extensive debt networks and superior solvency as
pig owners and brokers (Koch, 1974: 63-65). Rephrasing of
individual disputes in the language of rights and obligations
with regard to pigs thus strengthens both the value of that
currency and the dominating role of the "big men" who control
it.
5 Bohannan (1971: 257) discusses the function of general-purpose money
as providing a "common denominator" among several separate exchange
spheres, thus making commodities in each immediately exchangeable. (See
also Bohannan and Dalton, 1970: 230; Polanyi, 1957: 264-266.) Bohannan also
discusses the implications of this standardization for the value of the
commodities themselves. For example, receiving and giving money in order to
acquire, or in exchange for, women has acted to devalue the exchange and the
institution of bridewealth marriage (1971: 259).
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This case (Koch, 1974: 125-127) involves Selelemangke and
Herin, two men from neighboring wards in the same village.
They were clearing brushwood on contiguous garden plots
when Selelemangke claimed that Herin was trespassing on his
garden land. The next day, Herin came to the site with two
dozen men and boys from his ward; Selelemangke, likewise,
was accompanied by his supporters. A shouting match
between the groups developed into a scuffle, but disapproving
shouts from the older men present halted the fighting. Koch
notes that the dispute over land stemmed from an earlier
dispute over Selelemangke's failure to reciprocate the gift of a
pig he had received from the brother of Herin's wife. Beyond
this, there was an implicit grievance which arose out of a recent
inter-village war in which Herin's ward had been involved.
Selelemangke's son had fought in the war, against Herin's
ward, even though the two wards were traditionally allies.6 As
the dispute proceeded, the two groups continued to shout at
one another, and Koch (1974: 126) writes, they "warned of the
deplorable consequences their fight would have in the face of
the unsettled conflict with their common enemies." In an effort
to settle the dispute, Herin chose to define the major issues in
terms of the pig debt and offered to leave the land to
Selelemangke if the latter delivered a pig to Herin's brother-in-
law. This was not satisfactory to Selelemangke, however. A
compromise was finally reached when Herin agreed to cultivate
the land he had cleared (which presumably included some of
Selelemangke's property) for one season only, and
Selelemangke withdrew his claim (perhaps influenced by some
recognition of the unpaid pig debt).
There was no mediator or explicit third party handling this
dispute, but the supporters of both men played an implicit
third-party role in urging the disputants to compromise.
Midway through the dispute, several supporters discovered
remnants of an old stone wall marking a boundary between the
two pieces of land. The actions of the supporters in finding the
common boundary, and in pressing for the need to present a
united front to their common enemies, encouraged the two
disputants to rephrase their dispute in terms acceptable to
both. Note that Selelemangke had initially formulated the
dispute in terms of land rights, while Herin had defined the
issue in terms of pig transactions. The rephrasing suggested by
6 Note that Herin might have chosen to trespass on Selelemangke's land
simply in order to air these underlying grievances in public, although Koch
does not discuss this possibility.
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the supporters served also to shift slightly the definition of the
dispute to include the relations between the two wards and the
enemy village. That is, the broader interests of an audience to
which both men were closely linked altered the framework for
seeing the dispute by placing it in the context of alliances and
village security.
The next case, from a Chagga community in Tanzania, also
shows active audience participation in negotiating and defining
the object of the dispute, but the balance of power in this
community is much less even than among the JalW. The
Chagga are more heterogeneous than the Jal6; once a
homogeneous community of farmers dominated by local
kinship organization, the Chagga now also have a small but
influential group of educated, white-collar, salaried men who
work in nearby towns. The developing ties of social class cut
across lineage loyalties, Moore suggests (1977: 174), and affect
the choice of framework for conceptualizing issues in a dispute.
In the case below, one of the frameworks (that of individual
rights to land) clearly gained precedence over the other, more
traditional framework (that of the rights and obligations of
kinsmen to one another). Pressure to use this former
framework was created by an alliance between the third party
in the case (the ten-house leader) and the public of white-
collar, salaried men of which one of the disputants was a part.
The Uprooted Seedlings Dispute (Moore, 1977: 161-187)
involves two Chagga lineage brothers in Tanzania in a quarrel
over seedlings planted along the common boundary of their
coffee-banana groves. The case was brought by Elifatio, the
elder and poorer of the two men, against Richard, a prosperous
young clerk, for uprooting seedlings Elifatio had planted along
the common border of their land. The dispute was heard by a
small gathering of kinsmen and a few neighbors, one of whom
was leader of the imposed local government unit, a "ten-house
cell." Richard argued that he had not uprooted Elifatio's
seedings, since the seedlings had been planted, not on Elifatio's
land, but on a village (government-maintained) path which ran
through Richard's own land. Thus Richard's argument shifted
the substance of the dispute to the question of the boundary
between the pieces of land, and to a discussion of whose land
the path cut across. One of the senior men present then
suggested moving to the site of the uprooted trees to hear
Elifatio's wife and son say that they had seen Richard pull up
the seedlings. Others agreed with this suggestion, since it
would also allow examination of the path and boundary in
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question. Negotiation over the two conflicting definitions of the
dispute continued as the entire group actually moved to the
area where the plants had been.
As the discussion proceeded, the size of the group
increased with the addition of kinsmen and neighbors and
several white-collar workers who were daily drinking
companions of Richard. Elifatio's kin tried to focus the dispute
on the alleged wrong caused by Richard's actions: "He had no
business taking matters into his own hands and doing the
uprooting himself" (Moore, 1977: 170). But supporters of
Richard dominated the argument, and Richard himself
succeeded in defining the normative framework through his
presentation of the facts: "I don't know who planted the trees I
uprooted. I uprooted them after I saw that they were planted
in the land of the Government" (Moore, 1977: 168). Various
aspects of these issues emerged during the several hours of
talk. When a lineage elder called for a compromise agreement
to settle the matter, the ten-house leader openly opposed him,
asserting the need for an either/or decision in the case. The
ten-house leader then pronounced Richard in the right, based
on a judgment about the boundary issue and ignoring the self-
help issue.
Richard's success in part seems related to his ability to
work out a strategy of presentation and his facility in clearly
articulating his case. Beyond this, however, Moore points to
the vocal and prestigious roles of both Richard's kin and his
educated, salaried friends; and she notes the importance of
connections between these salaried men and the ten-house
leader who decided the case. The village hearing thus provided
"an opportunity for certain public collectivities to come into
competitive contact, to act authoritatively, to demonstrate and
to reaffirm local relationships of superordination and
subordination" (Moore, 1977: 177). The public which provided
Richard's point of orientation and support-white-collar
workers employed in the towns (and not their "impecunious
farmer brothers" [Moore, 1977: 177] in the village) -became the
crucial audience for the Chagga leader who presided at this
hearing.7 Had the common audience of lineage kinsmen taken
precedence (as in the JalM case), then the emphasis might have
7 This may slightly oversimply the dynamics of the hearing, since Moore
notes that the strength and prestige of the lineage seniors were also more on
Richard's side than on Elifatio's (1977: 176). Thus Richard had support from
both the white-collar workers and important lineage elders. Traditionally, the
elders would have sought a compromise decision in the case (and did so
unsuccessfully in this dispute). The ten-house leader, however, as spokesman
for a new, imposed legal system, advocated an either/or decision and thus was
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been on a mutually acceptable rephrasing. Instead, however,
the salaried men dominated the audience and influenced the
outcome of the dispute.8 Thus we find in nascent form the
processes which are so marked in bureaucratized court
contexts and which are well illustrated in the next phase of this
dispute: narrowing of the dispute in accordance with the
categories and interests of a particular public which may or
may not share the interests of either of the disputants; and an
outcome, defined by this rephrasing, which is advantageous to
the public or group which imposes its classification system on
the dispute.
Narrowing Through Specialized Legal Discourse
In the second phase of the Uprooted Seedlings Dispute,
Elifatio appealed the neighborhood ruling to a Primary Court
on Mt. Kilimanjaro, the lowest court in the national judicial
system in Tanzania. Since civil litigation would have cost a
filing fee, Elifatio followed the court clerk's advice and filed a
criminal complaint for malicious destruction of property, and
his case was heard a week later. Elifatio had no witnesses, and
Richard denied the charge that he had uprooted Elifatio's
seedlings. An effort by one of the court assessors to introduce
the relationship of the two men as a factor to be considered in
the case failed when the Magistrate ruled that the information
was irrelevant. The questions which had dominated the village
proceeding--on whose property the seedlings were planted,
and about the nature of the path-were not raised, and Elifatio
lost his case. The general legal category of "malicious
destruction of property" helped to define the normative
framework for the dispute in the court hearing. Moore notes
that, "once the issues are narrowed in this way, there is no
need to inquire into the general situation, the background, the
relationships of the parties, the motives, and the like" (1977:
182-183). Further, the local publics shaped the case at both the
village and court levels. The individuals and the ten-house
leader who supported Richard influenced the definition of the
case at the neighborhood hearing; and by refusing to act as
particularly attentive to the support provided by white-collar workers in the
audience.
8 The ten-house leader especially needed good contacts with the salaried
men to help with his unofficial and official duties. For example, when collecting
the necessary funds for the T.ANU party, the ten-house leader counted on the
salaried men's cooperation, since tey were more likely than the farmers to
have the cash available to contribute (Moore, 1977: 176-177).
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witnesses in court, they assured a definition and outcome in
Richard's favor (Moore, 1977: 186). 9
In the Tanzanian court, a specialized legal discourse
restricted the alternative frameworks available for defining
events and relationships in the dispute. Here, and in the next
two cases, there is one official legal language controlled by
court officials or by legal specialists; proper rephrasing of a
dispute in this language is essential if the dispute is to be dealt
with in an official disputing forum. These forums are clearly
set apart from the everyday contexts in which disputes arise
and thus facilitate the imposition of an official legal idiom for
disputing. To the extent, however, that the forums continue to
maintain close links to a relevant public beyond the boundaries
of the forum itself, the disputing idiom reinforces patterns of
social order advantageous to certain community groups and
less favorable to others.
The Ox Cart Dispute in a Thai provincial court was
recorded by Engel (1978: 120-124). It illustrates particularly..
well the use and implications of alternate idioms for phrasing
events and relationships. The official idiom for disputing in
Thailand, or what Engel terms the "language of law," derives
from a legal code modeled on western systems of justice and
introduced in Thailand at the turn of the century. As Engel
notes, "The new Thai law codes, both explicitly and implicitly,
articulated a new and radically different view of the private
citizen, the family, the social group, the administrative
bureaucracy, and the nation as a whole" (1978: 2-3). Most
private litigants in Thailand avoid phrasing their disputes in
this idiom, however, preferring traditional frameworks for
defining and handling conflict. These frameworks stress not
the rights of private citizens, but the obligations of status
superiors (men, fathers, husbands, patrons, etc.) to assume
responsibility for their dependents or clients. Nevertheless,
some individuals do attempt to pursue traditional goals in
court, using the official language, as in the following case.
In this case, the new legal code transformed a dispute
between two men, regarding cash payments of damages for the
death of the son of one of the men, into a lawsuit between the
wife of one and the daughter of the other. The case developed
9 Moore (1977: 186) describes both of these proceedings of dispute
settlement as "ceremonies of situational transformation .. . [that] turned
Elifatio's private quarrel into a public ruling." Our usage of the concept,
transformation, differs from hers in that we are talking about transformations
of the framework of argument of the dispute as it proceeds, rather than
transformations of "a dispute between two parties into a declaration by a third"
(Moore, 1975: 112).
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when the 16-year-old daughter of one man accidentally killed
the son of the other when the wheels of the ox cart she was
driving struck the boy. According to customary procedure, the
father was liable for his daughter's acts, and the father of the
dead child was the person to whom compensation was owed.
Both men initially agreed on the terms of compensation
(payment of the funeral expense) within this traditional
framework, but the dead child's father subsequently decided to
pursue the matter further in court to obtain additional cash
payment for his son's death. This required that the dispute be
rephrased, since legally he was not considered the proper
representative for his son (his marriage to his common-law
wife of twelve years had not been officially registered) and
since, legally, it was the 16-year-old girl, and not her father, who
was considered responsible for the act of negligence.
Engel writes that "the code procedure appears on the face
of it to have changed the dispute entirely. Instead of being a
conflict between [the two men], the code transforms the
dispute into a lawsuit involving [the wife of one and the
daughter of the other]. Except for the formalistic changes,
however, the procedural requirements of the law codes do not
really alter the goals of the disputants at all. The ultimate
purpose of the plaintiff is still to receive compensation from
[the father of the 16-year-old girl], just as it was from the
beginning" (1978: 123). Engel emphasizes that "the law codes
change the form but not the substance of the dispute. The
traditional goal of compensation is pursued by manipulation of
the Penal Code. The traditional concepts of standing and
liability are also retained implicitly, despite the fact that
figurehead plaintiffs and defendants must be substituted for
their traditional counterparts in the process of litigation" (1978:
123-124).
While Engel's analysis of this case is quite correct, we
would point to an aspect of the case not emphasized in his
book: the implications, both for the litigants and for broader
patterns of social organization, of moving to a specialized legal
discourse. Significantly, the original plaintiff (the father of the
dead child) did not succeed in rephrasing his claim in the
manner described above. He had filed a private criminal suit
against the 16-year-old girl; this action managed to properly
assign liability under the law code, but it did not fit the legal
requirement of standing. The judge acquitted the defendant,
holding that the plaintiff "had no standing to bring a criminal
action . . .on behalf of the deceased, because his marriage to
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the boy's mother had never been lawfully registered" (Engel,
1978: 121). In ruling against the plaintiff, the court skillfully
responded to two publics with competing interests in this case.
It implicitly rejected the traditional concept of standing in favor
of one linked to the officially defined concept of marriage, and
in this way reinforced a normative order decreed by the new
Thai code. At the same time, by acquitting the defendant, the
court reinforced the values and balance of power upheld in
traditional settlement procedures.' 0
The outcome of the Ox Cart Dispute illustrates both the
necessity of changing definitions of a dispute in order to make
it amenable to legal action and the critical level of skill and
knowledge required to manipulate definitions, for particular
ends, when specialized language and arenas are involved. That
the required transformation in this case was, in a sense,
procedural, should not obscure its substantive importance. A
certain degree of political bias is built into the disputing
process simply through the official legal language, since this
limits one's role in a case as litigant or as relevant witness
according to the specialized definitions provided by that
language." Even further, the need to rephrase a dispute into
the official language of law restricts the disputing arena to
those who can understand and use the language or who can
hire someone to act on their behalf.
The Lost Negatives Dispute is taken from Cain's (1979: 340-
341) research on solicitors in England, and illustrates the role
of lawyers in modifying disputes so that their client's needs, as
well as the requirements of the legal system, are met. Cain
writes that "clients bring many issues to the solicitor,
expressed and constituted in terms of a variety of everyday
discourses. The lawyer translates these, and reconstitutes the
issues in terms of a legal discourse which has trans-situational
applicability. In this sense law is a meta-language" (1979: 335).
10 We are indebted to David Engel (personal communication) for pointing
out this aspect of the case.
11 The California case of Marvin v. Marvin (1976) provides an interesting
parallel to the Thai Ox Cart dispute and underscores the substantive import of
definitions of persons in legal discourse. When Michele Marvin first sued Lee
Marvin for property rights upon the break-up of their relationship, the trial
court threw out the case on the ground that their unmarried living arrangement
implied a "meretricious" or sex-for-pay relationship. The landmark decision of
the California Supreme Court in 1976 to overturn the trial court was actually
just a procedural ruling that allowed the case to proceed to trial; the Court held
that unmarried persons are not barred from litigation over property even
though they had shared a bed. By simply allowing Michele Marvin to act as
plaintiff in her lawsuit (a procedural issue), the California Supreme Court
significantly altered the normative definition of the rights of unmarried women
in live-in relationships.
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Cain provides a clear example of translation in a case involving
some lost photographic negatives of a royal family. The
plaintiff was the original owner of the negatives; he gave the
negatives to a woman's magazine who apparently loaned them
to Smith, a director of a film company. Smith had since left the
company "under a cloud," and the plaintiff was suing the
company for £10,000 for the lost negatives.
Lawyer A (observed by Cain) represented the film
company itself (with its remaining two directors). Lawyer A
argued successfully before a court of appeal that "the company
had not been formed until three days after the photographs
had been given to Smith .... The company could not be
responsible for them as it was not in existence at the time. The
correct procedure would be to bring a case against Smith in
person and to join the woman's magazine in the action" (Cain,
1979: 340). Lawyer A thus achieved his client's outcome by
"juggling the translation of people into directors .... The
situation here was that in everyday discourse they [the
remaining two directors] were not responsible, and had had
nothing to do with the issue. They were being challenged,
however, in terms of a legal discourse of liability, which had to
be refuted in its own terms" (Cain, 1979: 341).
The Ox Cart and Lost Negatives disputes were both
shaped in significant ways by the existence of a written legal
code: an official, public discourse by which specific definitions
of roles and relationships were legitimated. Successful
management of these disputes required not simply persuasive
power or a broader array of supporters, but skill in
manipulating the discourse. Important questions in cases such
as these, then, include: who controls the use of legal (or other
official) language, who has access to the language (or to those
who are skilled in using it), and to what extent is the language
used responsive to the needs of disputants? Edelman suggests
that "the laws create a space in which to act" (1964: 103), but
one must ask "whose space" and "who is able to act in that
space?" In both the preceding cases, involvement of a
specialist in legal discourse was necessary to successful
management of the dispute. The specialist may serve as a kind
of "culture broker," translating the concerns of a disputant into
the language of law; or, as Cain (1979) suggests, the specialist
may impose his own concerns in defining the case.
12
12 Cain (1979) distinguishes between a lawyer's role as a translator and
his role as a transformer. The lawyer translates issues expressed in the
language of everyday discourse, into the terms of legal discourse (1979: 335). In
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Participation by legal specialists thus interjects another set
of interests in the phrasing of a dispute. These interests may
reflect, for example, the specialist's (whether lawyer or judge)
own financial concerns, relations with colleagues on the bench
or at the bar, or his own political attitudes as to goals or
interests to be pursued through a particular case. The official
legal language prescribes the general frameworks and
definitions to be used in classifying events in a dispute, but the
actual use of those categories will depend upon the
intermediary legal specialists. In situations where the
intermediaries and legal officials work regularly together over a
period of time, they may develop their own operational
meanings of the legal codes and follow their own informal
procedures for processing cases. Rephrasing of disputes may
then emphasize issues relevant to the informal norms and local
working environment of the legal forum, rather than to the
broader community or the legislative officials. Plea
negotiations by criminal court regulars in American courts
clearly illustrate this narrowing according to "folk legal
categories"-categories which are developed by actors within
the court as they process cases.
Criminal court research has shown how statutorily defined
categories of crime are modified by the subculture of justice in
local courts to produce the working definitions of "normal
crime" and "real" criminals used by court personnel. These
working definitions shape plea bargaining as well as other
discretionary decisions in the criminal courts (Sudnow, 1965;
Rosett and Cressey, 1976; Mather, 1979). They are the product
of repeated interaction among the same court personnel as
they routinely process cases, and they are shaped by the range
of deviance with which court personnel are presented on a
daily basis. Emerson (1969: 84), writing specifically about
juvenile court processes, explains one consequence of this
repeated handling of deviance: "Routinely encountering a wide
range of youthful misconduct, the court develops a relatively
narrow definition of delinquency. This definition generally
requires quite frequent and serious manifestations of
disturbing conduct before a youth will be categorized as 'really
delinquent."' Similarly, the categorization of cases within the
adult criminal court generally suggests a higher tolerance for
deviance than that found in society at large. This contributes
to specialized distinctions between levels of crimes. Thus, for
contrast, lawyers may transform the objectives desired by the client into others
which seem more reasonable from the lawyer's perspective (1979: 347).
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example, behavior that may correspond legally to first-degree
robbery will not be so labeled in plea negotiations because it is
not "really" first-degree robbery in the eyes of the court.
The case of the Drunken Burglar (Mather, 1979: 97-98) is
drawn from research on plea bargaining in Los Angeles
Superior Court, and it illustrates negotiations over the
narrowing of a burglary case. The defendant had five prior
burglary convictions. As the Public Defender described the
case, "The guy was caught drilling a hole in the wall next to a
safe in a store. There's no defense at all" (Mather, 1979: 97).
There was also evidence that the defendant had been drinking
just before his arrest, and the Public Defender felt that "the
guy's just an old drunk" (Mather, 1979: 97). Bargaining over the
disposition of this case centered on evaluation of the
defendant's character. Based on his view of the defendant, the
defense attorney tried to arrange a county jail sentence
through a transfer to a particularly lenient judge, but the
prosecutor would not agree. The defense attorney stated, "He
figured with five priors and drilling a hole in the wall by the
safe that the guy's not just an old drunk. That he's a
professional burglar. I don't think so, though" (Mather, 1979:
97). Thus the prosecutor insisted on a commitment to state
prison based on his classification of the defendant. Finally,
however, the case was transferred and the defendant pled
guilty with no sentence agreement. There were two
presentence investigations done on the defendant, and
although both reports were unfavorable, the defense attorney
had succeeded in delaying the case enough to win a lengthy
county jail sentence. The judge sentenced the defendant to one
year (the maximum possible) county jail with no credit for
time served (which was by then about nine months).
Whether the attorneys agree on application of their folk
legal categories, or whether they do not (as in the case above),
it is significant to note that their classifications are determined
with little direct participation from either the defendant or the
victim in the dispute. Working definitions of cases in the
criminal court reflect the attitudes and experience of the court
regulars and the ongoing relationships among them, as well as
the organizational priorities and demands of the court in terms
of, for example, its limited personnel and resources. In this
way, the narrowing processes of plea bargaining are often
highly responsive to, and shaped by, the requirements and
interests of the court itself.
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For example, attorneys in a criminal court evaluate the
strength of evidence in a case according to their perceptions of
local judge and jury behavior, rather than by textbook criteria
on evidence. Attorneys in Los Angeles categorized cases as
"dead bang" where there was a very high chance of conviction,
while attorneys in Connecticut referred to these same cases as
"born dead" (Mather, 1979; Heumann, 1978). Categories of
"serious" and "nonserious" (or "light") are similarly used by
criminal court participants to sort cases according to values
and priorities within the court.
In some courts political struggles between factions within
the court will influence the way a case is rephrased, as
suggested by Yngvesson's (1978: 141-148) study of the implicit
negotiations between criminal court personnel and the mental
health professionals who staffed an urban court clinic. The
clinic required a case load of a certain size to assure continued
funding of its program, and clinic personnel were eager to
establish the legitimacy of their (mental health) perspective on
case definition in order to increase their control over a
particular defendant population. The clinic thus sought to
broaden the range and increase the number of cases they
handled by controlling the category of seriousness by which
cases were classified.
These examples of the folk categories in American criminal
courts support Abel's (1973: 271) suggestion that as dispute
institutions become more differentiated "the universe of
substantive norms involved in the dispute process diverges
from that employed by the society at large . . . [and] the
process increasingly develops norms peculiar to itself." This
tendency is intensified as "the institution develops a carapace,
impermeable to external information, prescription, or influence.
Behavior grows introverted, preoccupied with its own norms
and activities. The problems it handles are the problems
defined by the institution, not the society; the solutions it
generates are solutions for the institution, not the society. If
carried to an extreme, the dispute process becomes wholly
involuted, hermetical, the exclusive domain of specialists, and
comprehensible to them alone" (Abel, 1973: 265). Legislatures
have responded recently to the specialized subculture of the
criminal courts by reducing the discretion of court officials
through determinate sentencing, mandatory prison terms, and
prohibitions on plea bargaining. In this way legislators hope to
realign court norms along the lines of what they perceive to be
broader societal norms (or rather, the norms of the relevant
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publics for legislators). Such attempts are likely to meet with
only limited success, however, in part because of the great
control over case definition and processing possessed by
lawyers and court officials .(see, e.g., Heumann and Loftin,
1979).
Summary
The cases discussed here illustrate the importance of the
process of narrowing disputes, the need to examine the
alternative definitions available to litigants, and the linkage
between these definitions and the broader political order.
Translation of disputes into the terms of a particular discourse
strengthens the position of those whose interests and values
are represented in that discourse. For example,
conceptualizing a dispute in terms of kin obligations instead of
property rights (as in the Chagga dispute) reinforces kinship
ties and maintains the power of kin elders.
The introduction of an official language of law increases the
power of certain political interests by restricting access to the
disputing forum, by defining the kinds of disputes which can be
placed on the agenda of the forum (and therefore, restricting
public discussions about disputes not so legitimated), and by
defining the roles of the parties in very specialized ways (and
thus affirming who is "relevant" to cases and who is not).
Thus, our discussion of narrowing illustrates various ways
in which the disputes of individuals serve as vehicles through
which others in society assert claims to power. Which others
become central in this process may depend upon the form of
discourse used and the barriers to involvement of broader
publics in the disputing process.
1. Where the discourse is specialized, those who know the
language will tend to control the disputing process; this
control may be further reinforced by varying degrees of
physical separation of the disputing forum from the
society at large.
2. Where the discourse is specialized, disputants may
have less access to and influence over the disputing
process than do others such as translators and
representatives of interested publics. Disputes will be
transformed in accordance with the relative power of
those within the disputing forum.
3. Under any form of discourse, playing to a broader
public becomes important for disputants and third
party alike and may be a particularly useful strategy for
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less advantaged litigants. In addition, highly active and
organized publics may capture the dispute, bypassing
litigant interests to press for outcomes in accord with
their own interests.
4. Where the discourse is general, the disputing process is
more accessible to both disputants and publics. Under
these circumstances, interests of a broad public or
particular groups will constrain the ways in which
litigants, supporters, and third parties can transform a
dispute.
5. The more general the language and the greater the
degree of audience participation, the greater the
possibility that the law can be shaped by, and will be
responsive to, a more broadly defined community
interest. The greater the degree of inequality in the
society, however, the more likely it will be that
particular interests will shape dispute transformations
and legal norms.
III. EXPANSION
On the other hand, this tendency (from breadth to narrowness) is not
irreversible; during the processing of disputes shifts of direction are
frequent, which expand the inquiry into new areas. And the key to a
deep understanding of the legal process lies in the explanation of this
dialectic (Santos 1977: 18).
In this section we will consider dispute transformations in
which an organizational framework not previously accepted by
the third party is imposed on the events and relationships
encompassed by the dispute. In some of the "narrowed" cases
discussed in the last section, we pointed to a struggle between
parties over how a dispute should be classified, and noted how
the results of the struggles served to increase or weaken the
power of particular factions at the local level. In the Uprooted
Seedlings Dispute the nature of this struggle was particularly
clear-cut, and we argued that the outcome of the dispute
further consolidated the power of a new "established" group
among the Chagga, one which seemed to be slowly gaining in
prestige and influence.
The cases we will consider next provide other examples of
struggles such as that between the Chagga farmers and town
workers, but in these cases there is a more clearly defined
established order. Narrowing the cases in terms of that order
occurs at one stage of the disputing process, but at another
stage-the one we will focus on here-the dispute is rephrased
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in a way that implicitly or explicitly challenges that order. The
consequences of dispute expansion may be limited to the
dispute itself, or they may involve broad legal or political
change. For example, in some of the cases presented below,
the outcome of expansion involves primarily a change within
the dispute, and the implicit challenge to the broader
normative order is not pursued (Headman's Fishdams, Deviant
Mechanic). In others, the attempted rephrasing has little effect
on the individual dispute (which serves as a vehicle for
expansion), but may have greater impact on the way future
cases develop (Underpaid Nurses, Thai Murder Case). Finally,
in some cases the outcome of the dispute significantly changes
the traditional folk system of classification and introduces new
criteria for organizing future disputes (Incestuous Lovers,
Mapp v. Ohio, Quadriplegic Father, Amish Dispute).
Explaining the outcome and consequences of expansion of
a dispute is obviously difficult. Factors one should look at
include: degree of dissatisfaction (both in intensity and scope)
with the established order in society; extent to which those
who are unhappy with the established order for reasons of
their own would benefit from an ordering of issues along the
lines suggested by the expansion; timing of emergence of a
particular case in relation to other similar ones; particular
constellation of facts and issues on the case itself; relation of
redefinition to parallel political cleavages; and extent to which
an audience becomes involved in the disputing process, giving
credibility and support to the shift in perspectives on the
dispute. Following Edelman's (1964) distinction between mass
and organized publics, we note that a broad, diffuse,
unorganized public may be content simply with a redefinition
of the dispute at hand, while a smaller, more narrowly focused,
organized public is more likely to pursue implications of the
dispute expansion leading to fundamental changes.
In addition to our attention to the audience role in dispute
expansion, we also emphasize the ways in which language is
used as a vehicle for transformation. Edelman (1964: 131)
noted that "the terms in which we name or speak of anything
do more than designate it; they place it in a class of objects,
thereby suggest with what it is to be judged and compared, and
define the perspective from which it will be viewed and
evaluated." To expand a dispute, in our terms, is to change the
perspective from which the third party would ordinarily view
the act, person, or relationship involved in the dispute by
placing it in a class of objects from which it would normally be
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distinguished. This is a political process. Individuals and
groups have vested interests in particular definitions of persons
and events; changes in definition tend to meet with resistance,
and thus require some basis of support if they are to succeed
(e.g., linkage to a relevant public with some political or
economic power). It is a linguistic process in that changes in
perspective and definition involve applying new labels to
familiar persons and events. These new labels act as "a
catalyst in the shaping of perception .... [P I eople potentially
see an issue in several alternative lights, and the languageform
itself evokes some of the potentialities" (Edelman, 1971: 68,
emphasis added).
Both the political and the linguistic aspects of this process
are shaped by the extent to which an audience directly
participates in the dispute, as well as by the form of discourse
in which the dispute is argued. We can contrast, for example,
expansion through specialized discourse in a forum with no
direct participation from a broader public with expansion
through general discourse involving broad audience
participation. In the first situation, control over case definition
is held by those within the forum who may seek to redefine
disputes by manipulating the categories of the official legal
language. Disputes may then be expanded through a process
of case-by-case reasoning in which the key feature is arguing
the points of similarity and difference between one case and
others (Levi, 1949). Linguistically, this involves focusing on
those parts of otherwise different cases which can be seen as
similar, and reasoning from them to the grounds for applying a
similar classification (Levi, 1949). Politically, the decision to
connect diverse facts in new ways must appeal to an
identifiable supportive public beyond the bounds of the forum.
Thus, lawyers and other supporters who take an active role in
redefining disputes may translate the concerns of particular
publics in the process of expanding an individual dispute.
Similarly, when the third party rephrases a case with an
implicit or explicit challenge to previous orderings, it will try to
link the new definition to the interests of a particular
constituency to which it feels itself (or wishes to be)
responsible.
Expansion by a larger public, through the use of general
discourse, involves a somewhat different process. The language
of categorization is less constraining since there are no official
labels to be manipulated, but the political problem of
sustaining an expansion may be more difficult in this situation.
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Here the problem is not linking up to a particular group or set
of interests which might justify a redefinition; rather, the
problem is that of actually mobilizing a vocal public around a
particular rephrasing of a case, so that a perspective which may
be in conflict with that of the community's power structure
acquires some legitimacy.
The arousal of such a public may occur through a highly
visible, dramatic image or use of language based on an
assumed set of shared meanings, with simple forms and
incomplete exposition (Edelman, 1977).13 Interestingly,
success in classifying an event or person in a particular way
may often depend on masking, rather than clearly articulating,
the premises on which the classification is based. This is
especially important when large publics are involved. It can be
accomplished by skillfully bringing into play familiar imagery
which connects with and highlights one aspect of a person or
situation, thus redefining the whole person or event in those
terms. The use of familiar imagery (through photography or a
dramatic public speech) to mobilize broad public support in
favor of a redefinition of a case is strikingly evident in several
of the cases we will discuss below. For example, in the Amish
Dispute, a photograph of Amish children fleeing police and
state officials acted as a vehicle for transforming the case by
focusing attention on helpless children being chased by police.
It shifted the framework in which the case was perceived from
one of willful disobedience of the state code by the Amish, to
one of persecution of the Amish by the state. Photographs or
other aesthetic forms may play a dual political role; most
commonly they reinforce conventional beliefs, but they can
also "teach their audience to see new meanings . . . leading
people to new insights and to perceptions of new possibilities"
(Edelman, 1977: 107; see also Langer, 1946). If, in fact, art
performs this dual function, it is surely a highly strategic
means for subtly changing the way events and relationships
are viewed, since traditional imagery can be used to graft new
meanings onto old relationships, rather than simply to
reinforce conventional beliefs.
Our discussion of dispute expansion is organized according
to the agent of transformation (third party, supporters,
audience). We will begin with cases in which audience
participation is implied, but primarily as a point of reference
13 Edelman (1977), following Bernstein (1975), describes this form of
language as "public language," in contrast to "formal language," which focuses
more on logical relationships.
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for the agent of transformation, who in each case is a third
party. We will move then to expansion by supporters, and
finally to three cases in which the dispute is expanded by
means of widespread public or audience participation in the
disputing process.
Third-Party Expansion
In the case of the Headman's Fishdams (Gluckman, 1955:
178-191) a dispute between a village headman and his kin over
their rights to use village land is converted by a judge into an
administrative decision on the fitness of a headman to occupy
his position. The dispute stemmed from claims by two sisters
for their rights to use fishdams in their brother's (Mahalihali)
village. Relations between the sisters and their father, the
previous headman, had been poor, and both had left his village.
However, the sisters had continued to fish there in spite of the
Lozi law that only residents of a village are entitled to use
village land. In exchange for use of the dams, one of the sisters
had sent her son to live with the headman, but the son
eventually left for "white country." When Mahalihali
succeeded his father, he asked for another son to replace the
one who had left, and his sister refused. In consequence he
denied both sisters rights to use the dams. The sisters' sons
sued unsuccessfully in a local court, which held that "no-one
works land in the village and lives elsewhere" (1955: 179). The
plaintiffs appealed to a higher court (a Lozi kuta), where the
case was heard by nine councillor-judges.
During the hearing there was lengthy discussion of two
competing Lozi rules: on the one hand, headmen have a legal
right to restrict use of fishdams to village residents; on the
other, kin have a moral obligation to support one another. The
judges debated these issues at length, lecturing the new
headman on his responsibilities to his sisters, and on the need
to make peace with relatives when quarrels separate them, but
attempting to balance this view with a consideration of
Mahalihali's rights as headman. Gluckman notes that "though
one of the most important laws in Loziland is that a headman
can only be compelled to allow his own villagers to work his
village land, most judges were reluctant to support him" (1955:
187). Mahalihali nevertheless continued to insist upon his legal
rights. The hearing was a lengthy one, and the problem of
achieving a proper balance between the rights of two
competing publics (villagers and kinsmen) became
increasingly complex. Finally, Solami, the head of the kuta,
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articulated a new sanction: "if Mahalihali persisted in his
intransigence, the kuta would appoint a new Mahalihali" (1955:
189). This solution to achieving a just (though unprecedented)
settlement was an ingenious one, in that it satisfied the
interests of several different factions in this case. The kin who
appealed the case won their rights to use the fishdams. At the
same time, the rights of headmanship in the dams was left
untouched (since the question of whether headmen in general
were entitled to enforce their right was sidestepped). Further,
as Gluckman notes in passing, the king had a special interest in
these particular dams "because he held them in his own right
and was entitled to the catch on alternate days .... Had the
dams been given absolutely to Mahalihali, he may have lacked
labour to fish them, and perhaps. . . the judge's support of his
nephews was to secure the king's fish catches" (1955: 195).
While Gluckman rejects this latter interpretation, it is
nevertheless interesting to note that the Solami's decision
successfully balanced the interests not only of the audience of
kin and villagers, but of the "royal audience" as well.
In this case, then, it was the third party who transformed
the dispute by changing the case from a dispute between a
headman and his kin over the use of dams to one over the
fitness of the headman to rule. In doing this the third party in
effect created a new law (Gluckman, 1955: 189). A similar
transformation occurred in the next case, Mapp v. Ohio,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1961. The Mapp case is
well known for its articulation of a new rule governing search
and seizure in state courts. Interestingly, however, this was
not the main issue argued before the lower courts and the
Supreme Court. The central issue for the Ohio Supreme Court
was the constitutionality of the Ohio obscenity statute; the U.S.
Supreme Court in a sense converted a conflict over obscenity
law into a conflict over the exclusionary rule in state criminal
procedure. Strictly speaking, the Mapp case did not start as a
"dispute," since it was a criminal prosecution against Miss
Mapp with no victim involved. We include it here because the
transformation of the case is such an interesting one; we
consider the two disputants to be Miss Mapp and the State of
Ohio.
The case of Mapp v. Ohio began in 1957 with the arrival of
three Cleveland police officers at the Mapp residence. The
officers were following up on a tip that a fugitive wanted in
connection with a recent bombing was hiding in the home.
However, when Miss Mapp asked what the officers wanted,
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they only said that they wanted to come in and question her,
without saying about what. After telephoning her attorney,
Miss Mapp refused to admit the police without a search
warrant. The police then undertook a surveillance of the
house; several hours later, four more police officers arrived.
Police broke into the house and waved a piece of paper (which
they claimed to be a warrant) at Miss Mapp, but they would
not let her read it. She grabbed the "warrant" and shoved it
down the front of her dress. Police then seized her, retrieved
the "warrant," and handcuffed her. Miss Mapp, in handcuffs,
was forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom while the officers
conducted a thorough search of the house. In the course of the
search the officers discovered some obscene pamphlets and
photographs. Miss Mapp was charged with and convicted of
possession of these obscene materials, in violation of an Ohio
state law which read in part, "No person shall knowingly...
have in his possession or under his control an obscene, lewd, or
lascivious book [or] ... picture . . ." (quoted in 367 U.S. at
643). As a result of her conviction, Miss Mapp was sentenced to
one to seven years in the state prison.
At the trial Miss Mapp's attorney had moved to have the
obscene material excluded as evidence due to the illegal nature
of the search of her house. Indeed, the prosecution was unable
to produce a copy of the search warrant, and could not explain
its inability to do so. As the Ohio Supreme Court later
admitted, the trial record suggests "considerable doubt as to
whether there ever was any warrant for the search of the
defendant's home" (170 Ohio St. at 430). Despite the illegal
circumstances of the search, the trial court had admitted the
obscene items into evidence based on Ohio case law which did
not mandate an exclusionary rule (i.e., under Ohio law, illegally
seized evidence was admissible in criminal trials).
On appeal the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the admission
of the evidence at trial. The Court noted that the conviction
could have been reversed if the evidence had been obtained
through shocking methods that "offend 'a sense of justice,"'
but that no brutal or offensive force was used against the
defendant in this case (170 Ohio St. at 431). Turning to the
second issue-the validity of the obscenity law itself-four of
the seven justices of the Ohio Supreme Court held that the
obscenity law was unconstitutional by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments as state interference with the freedom of speech
and press. Miss Mapp's conviction was not reversed, however,
due to an unusual part of the Ohio Constitution which requires
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more than a simple majority of the justices to invalidate a state
statute.
14
Miss Mapp's attorneys pressed the issue of the validity of
the Ohio obscenity law in their appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The attorneys also argued that police methods used in
the Mapp case were so "shocking" that the evidence obtained
should be excluded as a violation of the Due Process Clause.
Significantly, however, Miss Mapp's attorneys did not urge that
a general exclusionary rule be applied to Ohio; they did not
urge reversal of Wolf v. Colorado (1949),15 or even cite that
case. But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction of
Miss Dollree Mapp by overturning their 1949 decision in Wolf v.
Colorado and requiring an exclusionary rule in all state
criminal trials. The Court thus used the Mapp case as a
vehicle for overturning the Wolf precedent and establishing a
far-reaching constitutional principle. The dissenting justices
bitterly protested that the Court majority had "simply 'reached
out' to overrule Wolf' and that there was "no justification for
regarding this case as an appropriate occasion for re-examining
Wolf' (Justice Harlan, 367 U.S. at 674-675). Commentators
have noted that there is surely some truth in this charge
(Allen, 1961: 22; Cortner and Lytle, 1971). But the Supreme
Court majority defended its action in part by referring to the
brief submitted by the amici curiae, the ACLU, and the Ohio
Civil Liberties Union, in support of Miss Mapp. This brief did
request that the Court re-examine and overrule Wolf, but the
request came in a short concluding paragraph without
supporting argument, and the bulk of the brief stressed other
issues.16 Nevertheless, the five-man majority of the court 17 was
14 The Ohio Constitution required "the concurrence of at least all but one
of the judges" of the Ohio Supreme Court in order to declare a state law
unconstitutional, except in the case of an affirmative ruling on
unconstitutionality by the Ohio Court of Appeals (quoted in footnote 3, 367 U.S.
at 673). Since the Ohio Court of Appeals had not invalidated the obscenity
statute, the vote of four out of seven of the judges on the Ohio Supreme Court
was insufficient to hold the statute unconstitutional.
15 In Wolf v. Colorado the Supreme Court stated that the Fourth
Amendment did apply to the states, but that the states were not required to
adopt an exclusionary rule to deter police and protect citizens from illegal
searches.
16 The entire paragraph, which came on page 20 of their brief, stated:
This case presents the issue of whether evidence obtained in an illegal
search and seizure can constitutionally be used in a State criminal
proceeding. We are aware of the view that this Court has taken on the
issue in Wolf v. Colorado (1949). It is our purpose by this paragraph to
respectfully request that this Court re-examine this issue and conclude
that the ordered liberty concept guaranteed to persons by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily requires that
evidence illegally obtained in violation thereof, not be admissible in
state criminal proceedings (quoted in footnote 5, 367 U.S. 6731.
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able to justify its action by reference to an argument raised by
concerned publics represented in the brief. Note that it was
the Court, however, and not the publics from which it drew its
support, that articulated this new normative framework for
viewing the issues in Miss Mapp's case.
18
The expansion of Mapp v. Ohio resolved Miss Mapp's
quarrel with the state of Ohio as to whether she should go to
prison. But the Court only settled the issue about evidence
obtained from an illegal search, and did not resolve the conflict
over the validity of the Ohio obscenity law. The Supreme
Court's decision did, however, have enormous impact in
articulating a new constitutional standard for the states and in
encouraging other legal challenges to state criminal procedures
based on a broadened view of constitutional requirements. As
Allen (1961: 47) wrote at the time, 'The Mapp case represents
the Supreme Court's most ambitious effort to affect and
determine the quality of state criminal justice."
Although the decision of Mapp v. Ohio involved the
creation of a new legal rule, it is important to note that dispute
expansion does not always result in rule change. Expansion
refers to the assertion of a new ordering or definition of the
issues in a particular dispute; this new definition carries the
possibility of general normative change for the society, but
actual rule change will depend on other factors such as timing,
the political context of expansion, the extent of support for the
new framework, and so forth. For example, in the case of the
Headman's Fishdams, the judge asserted new powers for the
kuta to remove a headman, but Gluckman's material does not
reveal whether or not those powers were ever referred to or
anticipated in later actions. That is, we do not know the extent
17 The Supreme Court's decision was 6-3 to overturn the conviction of
Miss Mapp. But only five justices based their decision on overruling Wolf; the
sixth, Justice Stewart, agreed with the dissenters that the Mapp case was not
an appropriate one for re-examination of Wolf, but nevertheless voted to
reverse the judgment against Miss Mapp because of unconstitutionality of the
Ohio statute.
18 The transformation by the Supreme Court in the Mapp case involves
two sets of changes. On the one hand, the Court actually shifted the
framework of argument from the obscenity issue (considered primary by the
state appellate court) to the issue of search and seizure. On the other hand,
within the context of search and seizure, the Court expanded the due process
requirements from those considered by the Ohio trial and appellate courts
(which were in the framework of Rochin v. California) to the stronger
standard invoked by the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado. Both changes
illustrate Richardson and Vines' general point on shifts in the substance of a
case as it moves through the appellate courts: "one of the important political
functions of the appellate process ... is . . . the transformation of cases that
were routine trial types in the district into cases with greater political
significance as civil liberties issues" (Richardson and Vines, 1968: 105).
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to which the judge's action redefined power relations or set
new precedent. Expansion is an extremely useful concept
precisely because it may provide a link between data on
dispute resolution and subsequent change in the public order.
The debate over the new public law litigation is relevant
here. Litigation over conditions in prisons, mental hospitals,
and public schools essentially requires that trial court judges
create their own normative frameworks for defining the issues
in dispute. As Chayes (1976: 1297-1298) writes, "With the
diffusion of the party structure, fact issues are no longer
sharply drawn in a confrontation between two adversaries, one
asserting the affirmative and the other the negative. The
litigation is often extraordinarily complex and extended in
time, with a continuous and intricate interplay between factual
and legal elements .... The scope of the fact investigation and
the sheer volume of factual material that can be exhumed by
the discovery process pose enormous problems of organization
and assimilation. All these factors thrust the trial judge into an
active role in shaping, organizing and facilitating the
litigation" (1976: 1297-1298, emphasis added; see also
Eisenberg, 1978: 426-431). Judges in public interest litigation
are not only developing a new ordering of the issues, but
through this new ordering may be bringing about a significant
redistribution of power (see also Eisenberg and Yeazell,
1980).19
In practice it is almost inevitable that courts will exercise
social control in the process of resolving individual disputes
(Shapiro, 1975: 333). An interesting question, then, is: under
what conditions will courts (or other third parties) develop new
ways of looking at disputes, ways that may not draw on
traditional assumptions and norms but instead invoke a
different social ordering? March (1956) suggested this line of
inquiry in his critique of Gluckman's (1955) book on the
Barotse judicial process. March noted that decision makers do
not always restrict themselves to the alternatives presented
them, and he cited the case of the Headman's Fishdams as a
"striking example" of a judge creating a new alternative to
solve a serious problem. March then posed such fundamental
questions for the study of judicial processes as: "Under what
19 Eisenberg and Yeazell (1980) argue that the courts' role in public law
litigation is not so new or extraordinary when compared to procedures and
remedies that courts have developed since the twelfth century. What is new,
they suggest, are the kinds of rights being protected and the direction of the
redistribution of power; hence, debate should focus on the substantive issues
rather than on the procedural ones.
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conditions will an institution or an individual attempt to
expand the set of alternatives considered? What are the
mechanisms that induce the acceptance of a new alternative?
Who is likely to pose new alternatives?" (1956: 534).
Expansion by Supporters
A familiar example of expansion by a supporter in
American courts is the lawyer representing an individual
litigant for the purposes of furthering a group interest or
vindicating a social principle (see Casper, 1972). The lawyer
may be formally tied to an organized interest group or may,
individually, seek to advance a group interest. As Casper (1972:
158) points out, either way the lawyer is using the litigation of a
discrete dispute to pursue a particular policy outcome. In
addition to the activity of lawyers, interest groups themselves
quite often are agents of expansion through financial support of
litigation, public statements, and circulation of information to
endorse an expanded view of a dispute. This is illustrated in
the next two cases.
The case of the Quadriplegic Father (Hager, 1979: 3, 32)
involved a disabled father who had lost custody of his two sons
in a divorce proceeding. The trial court in Los Angeles
emphasized the father's physical disability to reach the
conclusion that the father could not have a "normal
relationship" with his sons; custody was thus awarded to the
mother (in spite of the fact that the boys had been living with
the father, and the mother had not seen them for five years
prior to the divorce). The California Supreme Court
overturned the order, holding that "the trial judge had focused
too narrowly on [the father's] physical condition" (Hager, 1979:
32). The state Supreme Court instructed judges in future
custody cases to view handicapped persons "as individuals,"
considering emotional, intellectual, and other factors in
deciding parental fitness and not placing undue importance on
physical abilities. The Court was unanimous in its vote, and
Justice Mosk wrote an outspoken opinion which "condemned
as 'false and demeaning' the presumption that a handicapped
person could not be a good parent" (Hager, 1979: 3).
The father was represented by lawyers from the Western
Law Center for the Handicapped. But notwithstanding this
successful challenge to a commonly held bias against
handicapped persons, the rights of the quadriplegic father are
still unclear. The Supreme Court of California sent the case
back to the trial court for further proceedings, noting that any
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"additional circumstances" that had developed during the
appeal should be considered in determining the best interests
of the children. During the two years since the divorce, the
boys had been living with their mother in New York, so it was
by no means certain that the father would finally be awarded
custody. We do not yet know what the broader consequences
of this lawsuit will be, since the case is part of a political
struggle to increase the power and legal rights of a specific
group in society. Lawyers for the Western Law Center for the
Handicapped urged the California Supreme Court to redefine
handicapped persons as belonging more within the category of
normal persons. Through such litigation the interest group
helped to put the problems of the handicapped on the political
agenda and to legitimate their claims.
In the case above, the third party accepted the expanded
definition of the dispute, but political constraints and
constraints from the specialized discourse may inhibit such a
third-party role, as in the case of the Underpaid Nurses
(Bennetts, 1979: 20). A widespread norm, supported by federal
legislation and administrative agencies, states that there
should be "equal pay for equal work." But women's earnings
are, on the average, 57 percent of men's, a gap that has
remained for decades. Further, "women who have completed
four years of college earn less than men who have completed
the eighth grade," according to economist Frances Hutner
(quoted by Bennetts, 1979: 20). The main problem is that
occupations are significantly segregated by sex, with jobs
typically held by men receiving higher pay than those held by
women. Women's rights activists are now attacking that
underlying problem with test cases designed to present a new
normative framework for ordering disputes over wage
discrimination. The expanded concept is that of "equal pay for
work of comparable worth." In a recent Colorado case a group
of nurses sued the city and county of Denver charging sex
discrimination. They alleged that "jobs should be evaluated
according to the skills and responsibilities required and that
jobs of 'equal value' or 'comparable worth' should be
compensated equally, even though they may be different in
nature" (Bennetts, 1979: 20). As an example of the
discrimination involved under this new definition, one of the
plaintiffs (who is now assistant dean of a nursing school)
pointed out that "tree trimmers, sign painters, and parking
meter repairmen, among others, were all paid more than
nurses" (Bennetts, 1979: 20).
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The implications of adopting a "comparable worth" norm
are substantial. The federal judge in Colorado dismissed the
nurses' claim without a hearing, saying, "This is a case which is
pregnant with the possibility of disrupting the entire economic
system of the United States of America .... I'm not going to
restructure the entire economy of the U.S." (Bennetts, 1979:
20). Other test cases on this issue have similarly been rejected
by courts; recently the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an
appeal in the Denver case (Greenhouse, 1980: A17). But the
plaintiffs in these cases had been unable to get a court hearing;
no judge thus far has been willing to stretch the legal concept
of "equal work" to encompass fact situations involving work of
"equal value." "No legal handle currently exists" to facilitate
litigation on the problem (Berger, 1980: 33). Interest group
litigation on behalf of women in low-paying jobs has continued
to press for that "handle," however; and indeed one lower
federal court has just ruled that a lawsuit may proceed on a
comparable worth theory (Greenhouse, 1980: A17).
Even though the Denver nurses lost in their court
appearance, such cases may be succeeding nonetheless in
persuading people to consider alternative formulations of the
problem of income inequality for male and female workers. By
creating a new configuration of facts, with nurses compared to
sign painters, the women's rights advocates may get people to
question traditional categories and taken-for-granted
assumptions. The case of the Underpaid Nurses illustrates one
stage in a lengthy and subtle process. But it may take a
particularly dramatic event or the creation of a good metaphor
to accelerate a change of this kind (see Edelman, 1971: 72).
The idea that supporters may play a significant role in
redefining disputes applies also to nonindustrial societies
where individuals or groups seek to expand individual disputes
as a means of pursuing broader political interests. The Thai
Murder Case (Engel, 1978: 145-148) illustrates expansion
pursued by supporters in one of the hill tribes of Thailand. A
22-year-old man from the Karen tribe was found shot to death
in the forest near the fields of the neighboring Meo tribe. The
mother of the Karen tribesman brought a lawsuit against the
Meo owner of th, field in the centralized Thai court some
distance from the hill tribes. The suit occurred in the context
of increasing competition and hostility between the tribes due
to population increases and insufficiency of land. Engel notes
that the murder "served to mobilize the Karen community
against the Miao encroachers" (1978: 147). The Karen
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encouraged and supported the plaintiff in the dispute, believing
"that if they won the case then the Miao would be afraid of
them, and would move their village away.... the Karen
would then have enough land for their people and nobody
would bother their land any more" (Nusit 1970: 17; quoted in
Engel 1978: 147).
Engel notes that the case ended "anticlimactically" eight
months after it had begun. The Karen community could not
sustain its broader definition of the case in terms of conflict
vith the Meo tribe, Engel suggests, because of the distances
involved to reach the court, the time and money involved, and
the Karen's realization of the weaknesses of the specific case.
The murder case itself was "effectively mediated and resolved"
according to Engel (1978: 148). It is quite likely that the Thai
court endeavored to rephrase the dispute into the discrete,
limited parts of a murder case and thus avoid the larger issues
of social conflict between the two tribes. Had the local
audience of Karen tribesmen been less physically distant, and
had their conflict with the Meo been perceived as more
immediately threatening by Thai authorities, the expansion of
this dispute might have had a greater chance of success. This
suggests that the lack of a connecting bridge between the local
public and the third party in this case may have affected its
outcome, although (as in the case of the Underpaid Nurses)
this case may be part of a process through which this bridge is
being created.
Expansion by an Audience
In the cases above, a strong individual or organized group
actively and consciously advanced a new definition of the
particular dispute. In this section we consider the expansion of
a dispute through the involvement of a more diffuse group-a
broad audience that, through its attention and concern,
expands the framework of the dispute. The channels of
communication are especially important for explaining the
dynamics of this type of expansion, since the control over those
channels influences the extent to which a wider audience can
be mobilized. For example, the gossip network of a small
fishing village or the mass media in modern society play a key
role in developing an audience which affects the course of a
dispute. The following case documents a struggle between a
community elite which seeks to impose its own folk system of
norms on a dispute, and others in the community who attempt
to redefine the dispute in the light of their own concerns.
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Gossip is the vehicle through which this struggle is carried out.
As in many face-to-face societies, criteria set by the gossipers
serve to define cases and shape outcomes, particularly where
morals are at issue.
The case of the Deviant Mechanic (Yngvesson, 1976: 164-
167) took place in a Scandinavian island fishing community
(Rock Island). The case involved a self-trained mechanic,
Albert Cooper, who was popular with the island children and
often gave them rides to a remote beach at the tip of the island.
Although the younger children enjoyed swimming with Albert,
twelve- and thirteen-year-old girls "began complaining that
Albert was pestering them to go swimming out at Pebble Beach
and that he insisted there that they bathe without swimsuits"
(Yngvesson, 1976: 164). As was typical of dispute processing on
the island, the case was not aired in a public forum; rather, the
behavior of Albert Cooper was the subject of island gossip.
Gossip served to focus opinion but with an interesting shift,
after a number of years, over which gossipers' definition of the
situation prevailed. Gossip was carried on in private homes,
over coffee, and at the post office. There were different gossip
networks in the village, determined in part by birth and kinship
status, but there were overlaps between these networks
created by cross-cutting allegiances (husbands' membership on
same fishing team, friendship based on age of children, etc.)
and by certain pivotal persons (e.g., the postmistress) who
linked networks.
In this case, gossip focused on whether Albert Cooper's
behavior with the young girls could be considered "normal."
During the early years of the dispute, members of the island's
most prestigious kin group (who actually controlled the
definition of morality in the village) were dominant in defining
the case. Albert Cooper was a fifth-generation resident of the
island and a member of this kin group. Through careful
manipulation of the gossip networks, members of this group
established Albert's behavior as "normal," stating simply "he is
that way," or referring to the fact that Albert had run naked
since he was a child in the rocky uninhabited areas of the
island (Yngvesson, 1976: 165). By a prudent choice of persons
outside their immediate network (such as the postmistress) as
an "audience" who could relay information to a broader island
public, Albert's kin were able to control island opinion. As
Paine (1967: 283) notes, "The concepts of confidence and
audience are both crucial" to an understanding of gossip. An
individual gossiper distributes information in a selective way,
812 LAW & SOCIETY / 15:3-4
to a selected audience, with a view to heightening his control
over message routes and to assure that his definition of the
situation prevails.
Some of the island women disagreed with the excuse
provided for Albert's actions, but these women were either
born off the island or otherwise had low standing on the island
social scale. Consequently, a definition of the case as, in effect,
"no case" prevailed for several years, and Albert's pestering of
young girls continued. Finally, however, a series of other
actions by Albert Cooper (adultery and public opposition to a
common island stand on a nature reserve) precipitated a
redefinition of the case as "serious" (again via gossip). A
broader island audience with information and opinions about
Albert began to circulate its views, and the original objections
to Albert's behavior by the less prestigious island women
began to acquire legitimacy. Then, at an Island Council
meeting, one of the fishermen publicly criticized Albert Cooper
for his opposition to the nature reserve. He stood up in the
meeting and loudly announced that 'There is only one person
in this room who is against us and for the reserve, and he is
sitting right behind me!" (Yngvesson, 1976: 69). This brief but
dramatic speech was symbolically an important event in this
case. It was made by a politically prominent, but socially
"fringe" fisherman in the community. It was made possible by
the fact that sufficient disapproving gossip had been circulated
about Albert. At the same time, the speech served as a catalyst
of public opinion, producing much more noticeable overt public
response to Albert in the way of stares and avoidance. The
speech was able to accomplish this because the imagery it used
reclassified the dispute, which previously had been defined (by
the elite) as an "odd but normal act by one of our own," into an
act committed by "someone who is not one of us." The imagery
of islanders and mainlanders, fishermen and others, "one of us"
and "them" was frequently used on the island as a means of
articulating group identity, and thus it was an effective way of
solidifying the increasing unease with Albert's behavior into
more overt action. While this action did not suddenly effect a
shift in Albert's social standing, over a period of time his
isolation increased and came to resemble the ostracism
imposed on serious rule breakers. In a community of this kind,
this is the ultimate-and socially most devastating-form of
sanction imposed.
Conflict-management processes similar to these are
reported for other face-to-face communities where gossip and
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public disgrace provide effective methods of social control. In
these communities public opinion, formed through gossip
networks, and modified through the actions of structural
outsiders such as the fisherman (or a Welsh youth group,
Peters, 1972), acts as a mechanism for redefining persons and
events.
The next case of expansion by an audience is the converse
of the process of increasing audience involvement. In the case
of the Incestuous Lovers (Pospisil, 1969: 208-229) it is the loss of
interest by an audience which precipitates a redefinition of the
case. A prestigious headman among the Kapauku Papuans of
West New Guinea fell in love with his paternal parallel cousin,
who happened, however, to belong to his own "sib." The
Kapauku define a marriage within one's own sib as incestuous,
and consequently the headman eloped with his lover and fled
to the bush. The girl's father, a headman of greater political
influence than the offender, ruled that his daughter and her
seducer should be punished by death.20 Together with the
patrilineal kin of the seducer, he searched widely for the
couple, but was not successful. While the search was going on,
the parents talked each evening "in front of a large audience of
their neighbors.., about their dilemma-having to do justice
and, by this very act, killing their close relatives" (Pospisil,
1969: 213).
Pospisil notes, however, that as time passed, both pursuers
and audience grew tired of this game. Further, he suggests that
"the noninvolved witnesses of the man hunt played the most
important part in this affair, they were the ultimate umpire,
who were expected to decide when enough effort had been
expended in hunting the fugitives and when the requirements
of morality and justice had been satisfied. Indeed, they
constituted what Durkheimean enthusiasts would call the
group mind, or public opinion. The guilty couple's maternal
relatives on one side and the couple's patrilineal relatives on
the other were scrutinizing the mood of this noninvolved
audience. Both groups of adversaries waited for the moment
when the bystanders would get tired of the futile game and
suggest a settlement" (1969: 213-214). Pospisil points to the
importance of the role of the girl's father in the process of
manipulating the audience: "his brilliant performance as an
indignant and vengeful father slowly changed to that of an
20 In this case the "dispute" can be seen as conflict between the
seducer/headman and the father of the girl, presented to an audience which
acts as the third party in the case.
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ostensibly subdued man, 'crushed by public opinion' and by
the futility of his attempts to administer justice" (1969: 214).
In this case, as in the preceding one, a dramatic speech or
performance pulled together diffuse public opinion into a more
articulate or explicit "statement" which transformed the
dispute. In contrast to the case of the Deviant Mechanic,
however, we see here a redefinition of the case as, in effect, "no
case," as a result of the audience's loss of interest (combined
with a series of subsequent exchanges between the kin of the
man and the woman in the case). The headman-lover kept his
incestuous bride as his wife and went unpunished (Pospisil,
1969: 215). Interestingly, however, Pospisil argues that the
transformation did not stop at this point, but was used by the
incestuous lover as a basis for reformulating Kapauku laws of
incest (1969: 215). Thus in this case we have a complex
interaction of audience and one of the immediate parties to the
case, which ultimately produces rule change.
In the next case, the role of the audience in expanding the
dispute is precipitated not by a speech or performance, but by
another aesthetic form: a vivid photograph published in
newspapers throughout the United States. Our discussion of
the Amish Dispute in Iowa (Rodgers, 1969) shows the
expansion of a local dispute through media attention and the
arousal of a wide audience. This case illustrates how a
particular image can change and broaden the public to whom
the dispute is relevant, and through this process redefine the
dispute.
2 1
The Amish dispute arose in the mid-1960's between a group
of Old Order Amish families and the local authorities in
Buchanan County, Iowa. The Old Order Amish, a conservative
branch of the Mennonites, live a simple farm life according to
traditional cultural and religious values. They shun the
amenities of modern life and dress like Dutch peasants of 400
years ago. Amish schools are a means of perpetuating the
traditional way of life. Modern schools, which teach "science,
the exposure to worldly views, organized games, plays, parties,
and instrumental music" which the Amish see as "sinful or
detrimental to their way of life," are rejected (Rodgers, 1969:
21 Note that our discussion of expansion thus differs somewhat from
Moore's (1972). Moore discusses the concept of the "expandability of
disputes," suggesting that "some disputes remain disputes between
individuals. Other disputes over exactly the same substantive matters expand
into confrontations of groups" (1972: 68). The enlarged context of a dispute
(where groups replace individuals as the key participants in conflict) is related
to our definition of expansion, but we focus on the new definition or argument
about a dispute that is associated with the changed context.
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17). The Amish insistence on maintaining traditional schooling
for their children has resulted in occasional conflicts with state
and local authorities. Courts in various states had always sided
with the government to require attendance in certified schools
(Cortner, 1975: 155-158).
The dispute in Buchanan County, Iowa, arose in 1962,
following a "hotly debated" school district election. The Amish
expected the Oelwein school board to pay the cost of certified
teachers in the Amish schools. The school board agreed to do
this only if the Amish school met the same curricular standards
as other schools in the district. An inspection by the Iowa state
authorities of the Amish schools concluded that they could not
meet state standards and that the Amish would have to pay
certified teachers, as they had done in the past. The Amish
then dismissed their two certified teachers and hired two
Amish with only eighth grade educations (Rodgers, 1969: 25).
For the next three years the Oelwein school board and
Buchanan County school district fought with the group of Old
Order Amish. Some Amish fathers were taken to court for
truancy because their children were attending schools which
did not meet state standards; they were convicted, fined, and
jailed for refusing to pay the fines. The Amish request to
exempt their children from the certified teacher requirement
was refused (Rodgers, 1969: 26). There were various attempts
by the school board to compromise, but these were rejected by
the Amish. New charges were then filed against the Amish and
new fines levied; "the unpaid fines began to mount into the
thousands of dollars" (Rodgers, 1969: 28).
Finally, the frustrated school board decided to use force to
take the Amish children to school. The school officials, sheriff,
deputy sheriff, and news reporters went to an Amish school
and announced that the 28 children must come out and board a
bus to go to the public school. The children ran away and
"newsmen got a dramatic picture of tiny children running in
fear as they climbed over, under, and through a fence to escape
into adjoining cornfields" (Rodgers, 1969: 29). The picture
provoked great sympathy for the Amish. Indeed, the picture so
changed the course of events that once it appeared in the
papers, "the school officials had lost all chance to enforce the
law" (Rodgers, 1969: 29). Due to wide public concern about the
issue, the Governor intervened and attempted to secure a
compromise that would uphold the law and yet not infringe on
the religious beliefs of the Amish. This proved to be a difficult
task.
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Different participants and relevant publics held divergent
views about what was the basic issue in dispute. According to
Rodgers' survey (1969: 47), two-thirds of the local opinion
leaders felt that the main question was an economic one; that
is, "the Amish just don't want to pay for certified teachers."
The local decision makers in Buchanan County similarly
emphasized the financial issue in the dispute; like the opinion
leaders, the decision makers did not feel that the primary
question was one of religious freedom (Rodgers, 1969: 76). The
local citizens in the Oelwein school district gave greater weight
to a cultural definition of the problem rather than a religious or
financial one. The cultural view was that the Amish feared the
influence of modern education on their children (Rodgers, 1969:
46-47). Finally, the Amish themselves defined the case in a
number of different ways. They stated frequently that the
financial issue was important and that they could not afford
certified teachers; they also argued the issue as one of religious
freedom; and yet they also stressed the need to preserve their
own traditional values in order to keep their children from
going astray (which they feared would happen as a result of
going to town schools).
The picture of Amish children and the resulting
widespread attention it invoked served to define the dispute in
terms of persecution of a religious minority. This definition
was given little credence at the local level either by the elite
(opinion leaders and decision makers) or the general citizenry,
in part because they knew of other Old Order Amish in the
area whose children were educated by certified teachers. How
could it violate the religious beliefs of one small group of
Amish in the Oelwein school district, they reasoned, when it
did not for other Amish?
But the wider audience in Iowa and elsewhere in the
nation were more sympathetic to the religious and cultural
freedom argument. Public reaction brought financial and legal
aid from concerned individuals and organized interest groups
such as the ACLU. This aid gave the Amish necessary
resources to continue the fight and hold out until they had won
(Rodgers, 1969: 86).
Ultimately the Amish won the right to maintain their own
schools. A state law, passed in 1967, allowed certain religious
groups to be exempt from school standards if their religious
tenets "differ substantially from the objectives, goals, or
philosophy of education embodied in the state-standard law"
(Rodgers, 1969: 35, quoting from the Des Moines Register).
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this case is not the
narrow modification of the Iowa code which ended the dispute
in that state. Instead, it is the resultant formation of an
organized lobbying group, the National Committee for Amish
Religious Freedom, which pressed the broader claims of the
Amish (freedom from compulsory school attendance) to victory
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972).
Cortner (1975: 158) notes that "an important consequence of
the 1965 Iowa clash was that it had spotlighted the plight of the
Amish for a nationwide audience and aroused sympathetic
supporters to action on their behalf." Wisconsin v. Yoder built
on this support. By establishing that the cultural values of the
Amish were indeed integral to their religious beliefs and thus
protected by the Constitution, this ruling significantly modified
the existing legal framework for dealing with conflicts between
state educational policy and the claims of a religious group.
Summary
The sequence of events in the Amish cases demonstrates
the crucial linkage between the original dispute in Iowa and
the ultimate Amish victory in the Supreme Court. The efforts
of the NCARF were critical to sustaining an expanded view of
the issues in dispute throughout the litigation process. The
resources of the ACLU and other groups who aided the Amish
in Iowa were also important, although the media were initially
responsible for altering the boundaries of the original school
dispute. In the Kapauku case of the Incestuous Lovers, the
father of the seduced girl mobilized an audience which defined
the seduction as a crime, but the same man, by playing the role
of a defeated advocate of justice, primed the audience to
redefine that particular seduction as acceptable behavior. As in
the Amish Dispute, it was the subsequent action of a party
experienced in the manipulation of the legal system (who, in
the Kapauku case, happened to be the seducer himself) which
sustained the original impetus created by the case through to a
redefinition of legal and social norms.
In our society, organized interest groups play an influential
role in pressing for political and legal change, and they may be
the most likely ones to seek dispute expansion. But others
may play this role, expanding disputes by adding new issues,
by enlarging the arena of discussion, or by increasing the
number and type of active participants. Important questions
about dispute expansion include: who is the participant most
likely to seek to expand a dispute? Under what conditions will
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an individual or group attempt an expansion? And how do
expansion processes vary across different societies?
IV. CONCLUSION
Our principal goal in this paper has been to develop an
,analytical framework, applicable across cultures, for relating
the management and outcome of individual disputes to the
maintenance and change of broader patterns of social order.
Such a framework would bridge conventional distinctions
between court and non-court disputing. We suggested that
disputing be viewed as a bargaining process in which the object
of the dispute, and the normative framework to be applied, are
negotiated as the dispute proceeds. Our approach emphasized
the ways in which disputes are transformed as they are
negotiated; we have paid particular attention to processes of
narrowing (through which conventional normative approaches
to acts and relationships are reiterated) and expansion
(through which new normative orientations are imposed).
Since transformations tend to be dominated by the
powerful, and since those in power typically have a vested
interest in the existing social order, most disputes will be
transformed by narrowing. We pointed, however, to the
importance of efforts by less advantaged individuals or groups
to argue disputes in ways which challenge accepted definitions,
and to strategies used by third parties, supporters, and others
either to sidestep this challenge (as in the case of the
Headman's Fishdams and the Underpaid Nurses) or to
increase its significance by mobilizing broad audience support
(as in the cases of the Deviant Mechanic, the Incestuous Lover,
and the Amish Dispute).
We found that it was particularly important to identify the
agent of transformation. In addition, it was crucial to
understand the social context of disputing. Thus we moved
away from the dyad/triad distinctions, which have been central
in much of the literature, to a conceptual framework
encompassing relevant publics and audiences, allies of the
disputants, lawyers and other spokesmen, as well as third
parties and the disputants themselves. In re-examining cases
from the ethnographic and political science literature, we found
that any of these participants might play a central role in
transforming a dispute. We also showed how invoking the
support of a larger public can be an important strategy in
dispute transformations which challenge the conventional
normative order (i.e., expansion). In this way our material
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confirms Schattschneider's (1960: 17) important point that "a
change of scope [of conflict] makes possible a new pattern of
competition, a new balance of forces and a new result. . ....
While audience mobilization is an important strategy for
expansion in a range of social and cultural contexts, the
process involved may be quite different, depending on what
Kidder (1979: 297) describes as the number of "layers of
intervening organizational complexity between lawmakers and
the governed." Thus, among the Jald, the Kapauku, and to
some extent, the Chagga (especially in the early, village-based
stages of disputing), expansion through involvement of an
audience is facilitated when the initial arena of the dispute
overlaps with the broadest public which might become involved
in transforming that dispute. On Rock Island, a relatively
closed network of gossipers seemed to add a greater degree of
organizational complexity, but because the language used by
gossipers and others is the same, and because there are points
of social contact between gossipers and audience, expansion is
in principle not difficult. What is a problem in these contexts is
the problem of voice. In small constituencies, as McConnell
(1966) has argued, the consequences of challenging accepted
frameworks may be severe, so people tend to avoid public
dissent. We suggested that in these contexts, structural
outsiders (such as the socially fringe fishermen or the Welsh
youth group) may play an important role in the expansion
process.
In contrast to these situations, the layers of intervening
organizational complexity in large industrial societies (and, to
an extent, in the Tanzanian context in which the later stages of
the Chagga dispute occurred) are much more numerous. Here,
much disputing is carried on in arenas which restrict or
exclude participation by the society at large and which use a
highly specialized form of discourse with which disputants as
well as a broader public are unlikely to be familiar. In these
situations, it is critical to have an agent of transformation who
can act as a broker-one who can communicate to disputants
and others, yet who is enough of an "insider" to the disputing
arena to be able to translate the concerns of disputants and
public into the official disputing language. An example of an
agent of this kind is the lawyer for the Western Law Center for
the Handicapped in the case of the Quadriplegic Father. A
further requirement for expansion in social contexts
characterized by this kind of organizational complexity is that
of a medium (such as newspapers, television, etc.) through
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which a broader public can be reached (as in the Amish
Dispute).
Organizational complexity is thus another significant
variable which influences expansion strategy. Our discussion
has emphasized, however, that a critical dimension of the
expansion process in all organizational contexts involves
phrasing or staging a dispute in such a way that support is
mobilized for a new definition of events. This is facilitated, in
both simple and more complex organizational frameworks, by
couching new meanings in familiar symbolic forms. This is
accomplished by attaching particular imagery to events or
relationships in dispute or by demonstrating a similarity
between fact situations that initially might appear to be
different. Phrasing and rephrasing are integral to all disputing
(conflict management through public agents and/or in public
forums), and how a dispute is phrased may prejudge, but at the
very least affects, the outcome.
A skeptic to our approach might ask: if socioeconomic
forces shape the language of disputing and if that language is
crucial to the outcome of a dispute, then why not focus on
social determinants and outcomes rather than on a mediating
variable, language? Indeed, this characterizes the work of
political scientists who began thirty-five years ago to focus on
the attributes and attitudes of judges, rather than on judicial
reasoning and doctrine, to explain the outcomes of Supreme
Court cases. It is also representative of the approach of many
anthropologists who, during the same period, focused on the
social correlates of particular styles of dispute management as
the most productive way of explaining the disputing process.
Nevertheless, the language of law-formal as well as informal
systems of meaning in terms of which disputants and others
argue and interact-has clear substantive importance.
Anthropologists point to the dependence of humans on
their definitional or rule-making capacity-their capacity to
impose a culturally constructed order on the social and
physical world (Geertz, 1973b: 44). Similarly, linguists note that
speech, like other social activities, requires rules of syntax and
semantics "to which individual thought must be submitted if it
seeks expression" (Lane, 1970: 21, quoting de Saussure). These
rules (linguistic, legal, religious) certainly do not determine
behavior (it is precisely the ability of humans to manipulate
rules that has provided such rich material for the analyses of
anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and others).
Nevertheless, as Thompson (1975: 262) argues, legal rules are
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more than "a pliant medium to be twisted this way and that by
whichever interests already possess effective power."
Our analysis of Jal& and Chagga disputing suggests that in
societies (or enclaves of societies) where written codes for
behavior are lacking, struggles nevertheless ensue over the
form in which events should be described. Whether a dispute
should be phrased as a failure to fulfill the obligations of
kinship and alliance, or as a conflict over individual rights to
land, has important implications for the relative power of
competing factions, and these factions (in the form of
interested publics or audiences) become active in efforts to
shape the definition and course of a dispute and may succeed
in transforming it. Where there are written legal codes, the
situation becomes more complex. As Thompson's analysis of
eighteenth-century legal history suggests, law then acquires an
existence in its own right, with "its own characteristics, its own
independent history and logic of evolution" (1975: 262). What is
critical here, as Gusfield (1977: 376) points out, is the character
of law as public discourse, as an official language which
legitimizes the relative power of individuals and groups in
society. Public struggles to define and transform the meaning
of acts and persons (e.g., of a handicapped man as a
quadriplegic or as a parent, or of the use of uncertified teachers
as an educational or as a religious matter) become significant
because these definitions not only inform and affect social
practice, but also provide the language for challenging that
practice.
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